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 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 The Cato Institute was established in 1977 as a nonpartisan public policy 
research foundation dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty, free 
markets, and limited government.  Cato’s Center for Constitutional Studies was 
established in 1989 to promote the principles of limited constitutional government 
that are the foundation of liberty.  Toward those ends, Cato publishes books and 
studies, conducts conferences, and publishes the annual Cato Supreme Court 
Review.  It also files amicus briefs with the courts, including in cases focusing on 
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause such as United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).  The present case centrally 
concerns Cato because it represents the federal government’s most egregious 
attempt to exceed its constitutional powers. 
 
ISSUE ADDRESSED BY AMICUS CURIAE 
 Whether the “individual mandate” provision of the Affordable Care Act is a 
valid exercise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.   
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29, both parties, through their respective counsel, 
have consented to the filing of this brief.  Amicus certifies that no counsel for any 
party authored this brief in whole or in part, that no counsel or party made a 
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. 
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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The individual mandate goes beyond Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce under existing doctrine.  The outermost bounds of the Supreme Court’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence—the “substantial effects” doctrine—prevent 
Congress from reaching intrastate non-economic activity regardless of whether it 
substantially affects interstate commerce.  Nor under existing law can Congress 
compel an inactive person to participate in commerce even if it purports to do so 
pursuant to a broader regulatory scheme. 
The Constitution does not permit Congress to conscript citizens into 
economic transactions in order to remedy the admitted shortcomings (which the 
government usually terms “necessities”) of a hastily assembled piece of legislation. 
Although the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to execute its 
regulatory authority over interstate commerce, it is not a blank check permitting 
Congress to ignore constitutional limits by manufacturing necessities.  “Salutatory 
goals and creative drafting have never been sufficient to offset an absence of 
enumerated powers.”  Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 780 (E.D. Va. 
2010).  The individual health insurance mandate is not constitutionally warranted 
because it is “necessary” to make PPACA function properly.2  Indeed, any law—
                                                 
2 “PPACA” refers to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, §§ 1501(a)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).   
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 “necessary” or otherwise—that purports to compel otherwise inactive citizens to 
engage in economic activity is unconstitutional.   
While the government emphasizes the “uniqueness” of the health care 
market and the wisdom of the legislation at issue, “this case is not about whether 
the Act is wise or unwise legislation…in fact, it is not really about our health care 
system at all.  It is principally about our federalist system, and it raises very 
important issues regarding the Constitutional role of the federal government.”  
Florida v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-
RV/EMT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).   
Moreover, what Congress is attempting to do here is quite literally 
unprecedented.  As a district court ruling for the government recognized, “in every 
Commerce Clause case presented thus far, there has been some sort of activity.  In 
this regard, the Health Care Reform Act arguably presents an issue of first 
impression.”  Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882, 893 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010).   Or, as another district court upholding the mandate conceded: “As 
previous Commerce Clause cases have all involved physical activity, as opposed to 
mental activity, i.e. decision-making, there is little judicial guidance on whether the 
latter falls within Congress’s power.”  Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *55 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011). 
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 The Congressional Budget Office agrees: “The government has never 
required people to buy any good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the 
United States.”  Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual 
Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994).  Nor has the government ever before 
imposed on every man and woman a civil penalty for declining to participate in the 
marketplace.  And never before have courts had to consider such a breathtaking 
assertion of power under the Commerce Clause.  Even in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 11 (1942), the federal government claimed “merely” the power to regulate 
what farmers grew, not to mandate that people become farmers, much less to force 
people to purchase farm products.3  Even if not purchasing health insurance is 
considered an “economic activity”—which of course would mean that every aspect 
of human life is economic activity—there is no legal basis for Congress to require 
individuals to enter the marketplace to buy a particular good or service. 
Amicus offers this brief to highlight that, although the substantial effects 
doctrine is often conceived as a Commerce Clause doctrine, it actually interprets 
the Necessary and Proper Clause in the context of the power to regulate interstate 
commerce.  Consequently, the limitations of this doctrine mark the existing limit 
on the constitutional requirement that a law be “necessary” to the execution of the 
                                                 
3 So, too, in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), the federal government 
successfully defended the constitutionality of the Social Security Act in part by 
emphasizing that it did not compel economic activity.  See id. at 621 (argument of 
Mr. Jackson) (“No compliance with any scheme of federal regulation is involved.”) 
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 commerce power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Because economic 
mandates do not fall under this existing doctrine, it is unconstitutional to impose 
economic mandates on the people under the guise of regulating commerce.   
Even if economic mandates are deemed “necessary,” however, they are not a 
“proper” means of executing an enumerated power because they unconstitutionally 
“commandeer” individuals.  Economic mandates alter the constitutional structure 
in an unprecedented way and thus do not “consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Individual Mandate Exceeds the Scope of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as Used to Execute the Power to Regulate Interstate 
Commerce Under the “Substantial Effects” Doctrine 
 
A. The “Substantial Effects” Doctrine Applies the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to the Commerce Power and Allows Congress to 
Use Its Regulatory Authority While Cabining That Authority 
 
  Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has asked whether a particular 
“economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce” when considering 
whether it falls under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  Gonzalez v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 
(2000) (in turn quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)).  The 
New Deal cases in which the “substantial effects” doctrine was first developed, 
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 however, found the authority for that doctrine not in the Commerce Clause itself 
but in its execution via the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Although prevailing 
legal convention describes the New Deal cases as expanding the definition of the 
word “commerce,” a closer examination shows that this definition remained 
unchanged.  Instead, the Court asked whether federal regulation of the activity in 
question was a necessary and proper means of exercising the power to regulate 
interstate commerce, because the regulated activity substantially affects that 
commerce.  Congress has never been allowed to go beyond that point. 
  In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), for example, the Court 
considered the power of Congress to “prohibit the employment of workmen in the 
production of goods ‘for interstate commerce’ at other than prescribed wages and 
hours.”  Id. at 105.  Rather than stretching the definition of “commerce,” the Court 
focused on how congressional power “extends to those activities intrastate which 
so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to 
make regulation of them appropriate.”  Id.  The authority cited for this proposition 
did not come from Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)—the 
Commerce Clause case that the Court had cited throughout its opinion—but from 
the foundational Necessary and Proper Clause case of McCulloch v. Maryland.  
  A year later, in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court used the 
same reasoning—not that “commerce” was being redefined but that the challenged 
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 measures were a necessary and proper means for regulating commerce as 
historically understood.  Like Darby, Wickard explicitly relies on the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, citing McCulloch as authority for congressional power, 
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 130, n.29—even if Roscoe Filburn’s personal production of 
wheat “may not be regarded as commerce,” id. at 125.  Thus, contrary to the 
conventional academic view, Wickard did not expand the Commerce Clause to 
include the power to regulate intrastate activity that, when aggregated, 
substantially affects interstate commerce.  Instead, “like Darby, Wickard is both a 
Commerce Clause and a Necessary and Proper Clause case[,]” with the substantial 
effects doctrine reaching Roscoe Filburn’s wheat growing via the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual 
Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L.L. 581, 594 (2011). 
 The above reading of Supreme Court jurisprudence is not novel; this court 
itself recently applied it.  In Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 
1242 (11th Cir. 2008), this court found that a law limiting the liability of rental car 
companies was a valid exercise of federal power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause as applied to the Commerce Clause.  The court did not hold that the 
“Commerce Clause per se” authorized the regulation of automobiles as 
“instrumentalities of commerce.” Id. at 1250.  Instead, it invoked the substantial 
effects doctrine, which it described as allowing Congress to “regulate both 
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 interstate and intrastate instances of th[e] activity, the latter being necessary and 
proper to effective regulation of the former.”  Id. at 1251.  That power could only 
be used, however, “[s]o long as the underlying economic activity the federal statute 
aims to protect is within the commerce power[.]”  Id. at 1252.  In Garcia, the 
economic activity of renting a car certainly qualified.  
The Garcia court also affirmed that “the Supreme Court has made clear that 
aggregation analysis is not always appropriate.”  Id. at 1251.  Namely, aggregation 
is inappropriate—improper—when the connection between the intrastate activity 
and the object of regulation (i.e., interstate commerce) is too attenuated.  In United 
States v. Lopez, for example, the Court found that aggregation could not apply 
except with regard to “economic activity.”  514 U.S. at 560.  “Even Wickard, 
which is perhaps the most-far-reaching example of Commerce Clause authority 
over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that possession of a 
gun in a school zone does not.”  Id.  And in United States v. Morrison, the Court 
held that the gender-motivated violence regulated by the Violence Against Women 
Act was not economic activity and thus had only an “indirect and remote” or 
“attenuated” effect on interstate commerce.  529 U.S. at 608 (quoting Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 556-57 (in turn quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 
37 (1937))), 615.  As this Court recognized in Garcia, the Lopez and Morrison 
decisions, like Wickard and Darby, refined the criteria for deciding whether 
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 Congress’s means are necessary and proper to the end of regulating interstate 
commerce, but did not redefine “commerce.”  The Court clarified the substantial 
effects doctrine by setting the regulation of intrastate economic activity (in certain 
contexts) as the absolute limit of federal power under the Commerce and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses.   
  Chief Justice Rehnquist described that limit on Congress’s power as follows: 
“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.  Conversely, 
non-economic activity cannot be regulated merely because it affects interstate 
commerce through a “but-for causal chain,” or has, in the aggregate, “substantial 
effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.” Morrison, 529 U.S. 
at 615.  Instead, the object of regulation must have a “close” qualitative “relation to 
interstate commerce,” not merely a substantial “quantitative” impact on the 
national economy.  NLRB, 301 U.S. at 37; Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute, 169 F.3d 820, 843 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d sub nom United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
  Adopting the distinction between economic and non-economic activity 
allowed the Court to determine whether legislation is “necessary” under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause without involving it in protracted, and arguably 
impossible, attempts to evaluate that legislation’s “more or less necessity or 
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 utility.”  Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank 
(February 23, 1791), in Legislative and Documentary History of the Bank of the 
United States 98 (H. St. Clair & D.A. Hall eds., reprinted Augustus M. Kelley 
1967) (1832).  This Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine limits congressional 
power when regulating intrastate economic activity to activities closely connected 
to interstate commerce.  Limiting the scope of “necessary” in such a way avoids 
granting Congress what would be tantamount to a federal police power.  See, e.g., 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.  Moreover, a power to regulate intrastate economic activity 
that has a substantial affect on interstate commerce is not so broad as to obstruct or 
supplant the states’ police powers.   
  In other words, to preserve the constitutional scheme of limited and 
enumerated powers, the Court drew a judicially administrable line beyond which 
Congress could not go in enacting “necessary” means to execute its power to 
regulate interstate commerce.  The substantial effects doctrine, as limited in Lopez 
and Morrison, thus established the outer doctrinal bounds of “necessity” under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  
  As Professor Randy Beck has explained, “[g]iven the close relationship 
between intrastate and interstate economic activity, a statute regulating local 
economic conduct will usually be calculated to accomplish an end legitimately 
encompassed within the plenary congressional authority over interstate 
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 commerce.”  J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 581, 625 (2002).  In short, regulating intrastate 
economic activity can be a “necessary” means of regulating interstate commerce as 
that term is understood under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The obvious 
corollary is that regulating non-economic activity cannot be “necessary,” 
regardless of its effect on interstate commerce.  And a power to regulate inactivity 
is even more remote from Congress’s power over interstate commerce. 
Most recently, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court found the cultivation of 
marijuana to be an economic activity that Congress could prohibit as a necessary 
and proper means of exercising of its commerce power.  545 U.S. at 22.  Raich 
explicitly adhered to the economic/non-economic distinction set out in Lopez and 
Morrison.  As Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, “Our case law firmly 
establishes Congress’s power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an 
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 17 (emphasis added).   Raich, therefore, reaffirmed that 
Congress’s ability to execute its commerce power through the Necessary and 
Proper Clause reaches only economic activity that happens to be intrastate. 
Raich also rejected the government’s contention that it was Angel Raich’s or 
Roscoe Filburn’s non-purchase of a commodity traded interstate that brought their 
personal cultivation under congressional power.  See Barnett, supra, at 602-03.  
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 Instead, Justice Stevens invoked the Webster’s Dictionary definition of 
“economics”—“the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities,” 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25—and thus refused to adopt sweeping theory the government 
advances here, that non-participation in the marketplace is itself economic activity. 
B. Regulating Inactivity Transcends the Necessary and Proper Clause’s 
Limits to the Commerce Clause 
 
There is no legal precedent interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause or 
the Commerce Clause as allowing Congress to compel activity in the guise of a 
regulation of commerce.  In Wickard, Roscoe Filburn was in the business of 
growing wheat and thus voluntarily engaged in economic activity.  See 317 U.S. at 
114-15.  In NLRB, the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was subject to 
regulatory schemes because it voluntarily engaged in the economic activity of 
steelmaking.  NLRB, 301 U.S. at 26.  The Civil Rights Cases concerned parties that 
voluntarily chose to engage in the economic activity of operating a restaurant, 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296 (1964), or a hotel, Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).  And finally, in Raich, 
Diane Monson and Angel Raich grew, processed, and consumed medicinal 
marijuana—all voluntary activities that the Supreme Court characterizes as a 
variety of “manufactur[ing].”  See 545 U.S. at 22. 
All these cases fall into two general categories.  Id. at 35-38 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (discussing the “two general circumstances” in which “the regulation 
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 of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of 
interstate commerce”—and limits thereto).  First, if persons voluntarily engage in 
economic activity, for example by starting a business or participating in 
agriculture, manufacturing, or another commercial endeavor, Congress can 
regulate the manner by which their activities are conducted as a necessary and 
proper exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce.  Such regulation of 
voluntary economic activity may include conditional mandates such as 
recordkeeping requirements or public disclosures.  But this doctrine has never 
included compelling people to engage in the economic activity itself, for example, 
by starting the business or by buying a product.   
The second category, exemplified by Raich, concerns Congress’s power to 
prohibit a particular kind of commerce altogether, such as that involving illegal 
drugs.  Beginning with the lottery case, Champion v. Anderson, 188 U.S. 321 
(1903), the Court recognized that the commerce power included the power to 
prohibit activities.  In Raich, the Court found that Congress may prohibit wholly 
intrastate instances of an activity as a “necessary” means of prohibiting a type of 
interstate commerce.  
Under either theory, however, although Congress can regulate or even 
prohibit voluntary economic actions that substantially affect interstate commerce, 
it cannot force people to undertake such actions—even if such actions, when 
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 voluntarily undertaken, would have been subject to regulation or prohibition.  The 
distinguishing characteristic between a legitimate regulation within the 
constitutional scheme of enumerated powers, and a limitless federal police power 
capable of compelling whatever behavior Congress sees fit, is whether a person 
can, in principle, avoid federal regulations by choosing not to engage in the 
regulated activity.  No such option exists with regard to the individual mandate; it 
cannot be avoided in principle.  It is not, therefore, a regulation of commercial 
activity, but an unprecedented command that individuals engage in commerce. 
 
II. The Individual Mandate Cannot be Justified as an “Essential Part of 
a Broader Regulatory Scheme” because Congress Cannot Regulate 
Inactivity 
 
A. Congress Cannot Compel Activity as Part of a Broader Economic 
Scheme 
 
Unable to justify the individual mandate under existing Commerce Clause 
and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine (let alone the fallback taxing power 
theories that we do not discuss here), the government has resorted to a new theory: 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to mandate economic 
activity when doing so is an essential part of a broader regulatory scheme.  In other 
words, while not itself a regulation of interstate commerce, nor a regulation of 
intrastate economic activity, nor even a regulation of intrastate non-economic 
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 activity, the individual mandate is a necessary and proper means of exercising the 
lawful ends of regulating the interstate health insurance industry.   
The government’s theory rests on a sentence from Lopez and a concurring 
opinion by Justice Scalia in Raich that actually only identified circumstances in 
which Congress may reach wholly intrastate non-economic activity.  See Raich, 
545 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our cases show that the regulation of 
intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of interstate 
commerce in two general circumstances.” (emphasis added)).  The first of these 
circumstances included the substantial effects doctrine, which he said is limited to 
reaching intrastate economic activity.  He then identified a second Necessary and 
Proper Clause doctrine by which “Congress may regulate even non-economic local 
activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of 
interstate commerce.” Id. at 37 (emphasis added).  These precedents do not justify 
mandating participation in commerce as part of a national economic plan. 
Moreover, Congress lacks a general police power, as the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized.  See Morrison, 529 U.S.  at 618-19 (quoting Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 566 (“The Constitution ... withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police 
power”); and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]e always 
have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that 
would permit Congress to exercise a police power”).  Thus if the Commerce 
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 Clause is interpreted as allowing Congress to mandate economic activity in service 
of a broader national scheme, the government must still identify some limiting 
principle.  The distinction between economic and non-economic would obviously 
provide no limit to this doctrine, because all human behaviors have some ultimate 
economic consequences.  The whole purpose for Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion was to question the usefulness of such a distinction in dealing with the 
problems posed by Raich.   
A more obvious line to draw is one between regulating activity—whether 
economic or non-economic—and inactivity.  Such a distinction provides a 
judicially administrable limiting principle with a minimum of judicial intrusion 
into complicated political or economic analysis.  It is also consistent with existing 
precedent.  In Lopez, the Court discussed reaching intrastate non-economic activity 
when doing so is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in 
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.”  514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).  In Raich, Justice Scalia proposed 
that “Congress may regulate even non-economic local activity if that regulation is a 
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” 545 U.S. at 37 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, in his Raich opinion, Justice Scalia used the word 
“activity” or “activities” 42 times.  See Jason Mazzone, Can Congress Force You 
to Be Healthy?  N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010, at A39.  There is good reason to doubt 
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 that Justice Scalia—who has referred to the Necessary and Proper Clause as “the 
last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action,” Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) (Scalia, J.)—would ever extend his 
proposed doctrine to reach inactivity.  See also United States v. Comstock, 130 S. 
Ct. 1949, 1983 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined in part by Scalia, J.). 
  Limiting Congress to regulating or prohibiting activity under both the 
“substantial effects” and the “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” doctrines 
would serve the same general purpose as the economic/non-economic distinction.  
Such a formal limitation would assure that exercises of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to execute the commerce power would be truly incidental to that power and 
not remote, or mere “pretext[s]” for “the accomplishment of objects not entrusted 
to the government.”  McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.  However imperfect, 
some such line must be drawn to preserve Article I’s structure of limited and 
enumerated powers. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“Although the resolution of specific cases has proved difficult, we have derived 
from the Constitution workable standards to assist in preserving separation of 
powers and checks and balances.”). Because accepting the government’s theory in 
this case would effectively demolish that structure, the government’s theory is 
constitutionally unsatisfying. 
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   To date, the government has offered no limiting principle on its asserted 
power to regulate when doing so is essential to a broader regulatory scheme.  In 
place of any constitutional limitation, the government attempts to distinguish the 
health insurance business as “unique” in various respects. Br. for Appellants at 7-
11.  But examining the “uniqueness” of the market being regulated and the 
problems Congress chose to ameliorate is precisely the sort of inquiry into the 
“more or less necessity” of a measure that the Supreme Court has always rejected. 
In the course of pointing to one particular “unique” aspect of health care, the 
government claims that the individual mandate is no different than requiring the 
advance purchase of health care.  Id. at 27.  Nearly everyone ultimately consumes 
health care—and consumption is clearly an economic act.  Why then, the argument 
goes, wouldn’t the Commerce Clause allow the federal government to direct that 
health care be purchased now, by obtaining insurance, rather than later when the 
medical bill comes due?  Id.  In other words, buying health insurance is just a 
timing decision about when, not whether, to incur medical costs.  
Instead of providing a constitutional limit on the power to impose economic 
mandates, again the government invites a judicial examination of the “more or less 
necessity” of congressional action:  Virtually all forms of insurance represent 
timing decisions—paying up front for burial costs, loss of life, disability, 
supplemental income, credit default, business interruption, and more.  See Florida, 
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 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *100-01 (discussing cost-shifting and timing 
decisions in all insurance markets).  Only a federal government of unbounded 
powers could mandate that every American insure against such risks.  “There will 
be no stopping point if that should be deemed the equivalent of activity for 
Commerce Clause purposes.”  Id. at *102.  And while it might be permissible to 
penalize an uninsured person who shows up at a hospital or doctor’s office 
demanding that his expenses be borne by the taxpayers, that is not what PPACA 
does.  Instead, PPACA penalizes all uninsured persons, not just those who seek to 
be reimbursed by government for costs they should have borne themselves. Id. at 
*72 n.14.  And PPACA does more than mandate coverage; it also prescribes 
certain provisions that each policy must include.  Many Americans who prefer to 
insure using, for example, Health Savings Accounts with high deductible coverage, 
will be told by their federal overseers that such coverage isn’t adequate.  Id. 
The Supreme Court’s repeatedly affirmed requirement that there be a 
constitutional limit on federal power cannot be side-stepped by invoking the 
admitted importance of reforming health care or the cost-shifting aspects of that 
market.  Because the courts will defer to Congress’s assessment of the rationality 
of addressing problems in the health care market, the retort that “health care is 
different” provides no judicially administrable limit on the new power to impose 
economic mandates on the people.  Indeed, if Congress can force otherwise 
 19
 inactive citizens to engage in economic transactions under the guise of regulating 
commerce, the claimed “uniqueness” of health care is no limiting principle because 
Congress has “plenary power” over “regulations of commerce.”  Darby, 312 U.S. 
at 115.  A “plenary power” over inactive citizens is hardly limited by the one-off 
exception the government urges here.  By claiming that “health care is special” and 
that the unique features of health care regulation justify the individual mandate, the 
government ignores the unprecedented nature of the individual mandate and 
instead offers a novel method of constitutional interpretation that would have 
courts weighing how necessary a given measure is.  
Striking down the individual mandate requires no such tortuous calculations 
and would affect no other law ever enacted by Congress.  “[T]he task is to identify 
a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate more than nothing (by 
declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less than everything (by declining 
to let Congress set the terms of analysis).”  Raich, 545 U.S at 47-48 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  Congress could have reformed the health care system in any number 
of ways that may have been better or worse as a matter of policy—including the 
adoption of a Medicare-for-Everyone “single payer” scheme—that would have 
been legally unassailable under existing Commerce Clause doctrine.  That it chose 
this particular regulatory scheme does not make every provision essential to its 
functioning automatically constitutional. 
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 B. Inactivity Is Not a Type of Activity 
The government and the lower courts ruling in its favor have implicitly 
acknowledged the requirement that Congress be regulating “activity” by redefining 
that word to include the making of an “economic decision,” or a decision not to 
act, or to remain uninsured, or numerous other “active” articulations of the status 
of someone not owning health insurance.  For example, in the most recent decision 
upholding the individual mandate, a district court described the difference between 
activity and inactivity as “pure semantics,” and held that Congress can regulate any 
“mental activity, i.e., decision-making,” which has an ultimate economic effect.  
Mead, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *60.  If a “decision” not to act is a 
federally regulable action, however, then inactivity is transformed into activity by a 
sort of linguistic alchemy that has at least three weaknesses.   
First, the difference between activity and inactivity—or acts and 
omissions—is a genuine and long-respected one.  See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton on 
the Law of Torts § 56 at 373 (5th ed. 1984) (“there runs through much of the law a 
distinction between action and inaction.”).  It is a basic principle of tort law, for 
example, that one has no duty to act, and cannot generally be punished for 
nonfeasance, but has only a duty to act reasonably, and not commit misfeasance.  
This Court has recently reaffirmed this principle.  Ironworkers Local Union 68 & 
Participating Emplrs. Health & Welfare Funds v. AstraZeneca Pharms., LP, No. 
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 08-16851, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4960, at *44 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2011).  So, too, 
in criminal law, one cannot generally be convicted without engaging in some type 
of activity.  United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1292-1293 (11th Cir. 2010).  
The activity/inactivity distinction is intuitively obvious and well understood by the 
ordinary person.  It is also the foundation of moral philosophy relevant to debates 
over health care law and policy.  See, e.g., Philippa Foot, Killing and Letting Die, 
in Moral Dilemmas 78-87 (2002) (distinguishing between prohibited killing and 
allowable withholding of care).  Contrary to the Mead court’s holding, it is the 
redefinition of inactivity as a type of activity that is a semantic trick.   
Second, while activity means engaging in a particular, definite act, inactivity 
means not engaging in a literally infinite set of acts.  At any instant, there are 
innumerable economic transactions in which one is not entering.  To allow 
Congress discretionary power to impose compulsory economic mandates within 
this infinite set of inactions—without constitutional constraint—would amount to 
granting the federal government a plenary and unlimited police power of the sort 
the Constitution specifically withholds.  See supra at 15; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.  
Finally, if inaction is deemed “economic” because of its economic effects, 
then the distinction between economic and non-economic activity established in 
Lopez and reaffirmed in Morrison and Raich would collapse.  Indeed, Lopez and 
Morrison stand for the proposition that Congress may not regulate intrastate non-
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 economic activities even if, in the aggregate, they have substantial effects on 
interstate commerce.  But any class of activity or inactivity, in the aggregate, can 
be said to have some economic consequences.  To define inactivity as an economic 
activity would destroy the line the Supreme Court has time and again drawn 
between the intrastate economic activity that Congress may reach and the intrastate 
non-economic activity it may not.  This Court should not so disregard the 
overwhelming precedent governing the scope of the Commerce and Necessary and 
Proper Clauses. 
 
III. The Individual Mandate Constitutes a “Commandeering of the 
People” That Is Not “Proper” Under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause 
 
The Supreme Court, in two cases presenting then-unprecedented assertions 
of power under the Commerce Clause, stated that Congress cannot use this power 
to mandate or “commandeer” state legislatures and executive officers.  Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992).  As the Court explained, doing so would be “fundamentally incompatible 
with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty,” and therefore improper under 
our federalist system. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.  The source of “residual state 
sovereignty” is the Tenth Amendment, which reiterates that the Constitution 
confers upon Congress “not all governmental powers, but only discrete, 
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 enumerated ones.”  Id. at 919.  The mandate at issue in Printz, even if necessary, 
thus could not be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause:  “When a 
‘la[w]…for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle 
of state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional 
provisions, “it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into execution the Commerce 
Clause.’” Id. at 923-24 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added). 
But the Tenth Amendment also recognizes that the people of the United 
States are sovereign: “The powers not delegated by the Constitution to the United 
States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or 
to the people.”  U.S. Const. amend. X (emphasis added).  Just as mandating that 
states take action is improper commandeering, so too is mandating that individual 
citizens enter into transactions with private companies.  This amounts to what Prof. 
Barnett has recently called an improper “commandeering of the people.”  See 
generally Barnett, supra, at 621-34.  In this way, the text of the Tenth Amendment 
protects not just state sovereignty, but also popular sovereignty.   
As Chief Justice John Jay noted in Chisholm v. Georgia, the people are 
“truly the sovereigns of the country,” 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 471-72 (1793), and 
elected officials merely their deputies, exercising a delegated authority.  Fellow 
Founder James Wilson agreed, recognizing that sovereignty starts with the 
individual citizen:  “If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why 
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 may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this 
likewise?”  Id. at 456 (emphasis added).  Although the Eleventh Amendment 
reversed the outcome of Chisholm and the Supreme Court has interpreted that 
Amendment as establishing state sovereignty, the Court has never repudiated the 
priority of popular sovereignty.  See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) 
(“[I]n our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of 
government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all 
government exists and acts.”); accord Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) 
(“In our country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its 
relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship.”). 
Thus, just as the Constitution disallows the “commandeering” of states as a 
means of regulating interstate commerce, so too does it bar a “commandeering of 
the people” for this purpose.  What very few mandates are imposed on the people 
by the federal government either derive from other clauses of the Constitution—
such as responding to censuses, U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, serving on juries, U.S. 
Const. amend. VI & VII, or filing tax returns, U.S. Const. amend. XVI—or rest on 
the fundamental pre-existing duties that citizens owe that government.  See, e.g., 
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) (relying on the “supreme and 
noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation” to 
reject a Thirteenth Amendment claim).  But citizens are not owned by the 
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 government and cannot be generally presumed to be subject to an indefinite federal 
command.  Various express provisions of the Constitution reflect this anti-
commandeering principle.  For example, persons may not be mandated to quarter 
soldiers in their homes in time of peace, to testify against themselves, to labor for 
another, or to yield up other rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.  
U.S. Const. amends. III, V, IX, XIII.  In the United States, there is not even a duty 
to vote.  So there is certainly no comparable pre-existing “supreme and noble duty” 
to engage in economic activity whenever doing so would be convenient to the 
congressional regulation of interstate commerce.  To hold otherwise would be to 
deprive the people of the United States of the residual sovereignty recognized in 
the Tenth Amendment and to make them the servants, rather than the masters, of 
Congress.  Cf. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) at 467 (Clinton 
Rossiter, ed., 1961) (“[to say] that the legislative body are themselves the 
constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon 
them is conclusive upon other departments” would “be to affirm that the deputy is 
greater than the principal; that the servant is above his master.”).  
There are also pragmatic reasons to believe that the individual mandate is 
not “proper.”  In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor explained that 
mandates on states are improper because, “where the Federal Government directs 
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
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 disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may 
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”  505 U.S. at 
169.  That proposition applies to the commandeering of individuals as well: the 
individual mandate has allowed Congress and the president to escape political 
accountability for what amounts to a tax increase on persons making less than 
$250,000 per year by compelling them to make payments directly to private 
companies.  It is the evasion of political accountability that explains why the 
mandate was formulated as a regulatory “requirement” enforced by a “penalty.”  
The individual mandate crosses the fundamental line between limited 
constitutional government and limitless power cabined only by the Congress’ 
political will—which is to say, not cabined at all.  Congress would then be the sole 
judge of the extent of its own authority—a proposition which the Founders 
explicitly and repeatedly denied and which no federal court has ever endorsed.   
In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 617-18 (1870), for example, 
the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that Congress is the sole judge of what 
acts are necessary and proper to carrying out its enumerated powers.  To admit that 
Congress has such unreviewable discretion,  
and, then, to exercise absolutely and without liability to question, in 
cases involving private rights, the powers thus determined to [be 
“necessary and proper”], would completely change the nature of 
American government.  It would convert the government, which the 
people ordained as a government of limited powers, into a 
government of unlimited powers….  It would obliterate every 
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 criterion which this court, speaking through the venerated Chief 
Justice [Marshall] in [McCulloch], established for the determination 
of the question whether legislative acts are constitutional or 
unconstitutional.  
 
If the word “proper” is to be more than dead letter, it must at least mean that 
acts which destroy the very purpose of Article I—to enumerate and therefore limit 
the powers of Congress—are improper.  If the federal power to enact “economic 
mandates” were upheld here, Congress would be free to require anything of the 
citizenry so long as it was part of a national regulatory plan.  Unsupported by any 
fundamental, preexisting, or traditional duty of citizenship, imposing “economic 
mandates” on the people is improper, both in the lay and constitutional senses of 
that word.  Allowing Congress to exercise such power would convert it from a 
government of delegated powers into one of general and unlimited authority. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the first time in American history, the federal government has attempted 
to “commandeer the people” by imposing on them an “economic mandate” not 
derived from pre-existing duties of citizenship.  Such economic mandates cannot 
be justified by existing Supreme Court doctrines defining and limiting the powers 
of Congress.  Upholding the power to impose economic mandates “would 
fundamentally alter the relationship of the federal government to the states and the 
people; nobody would ever again be able to claim plausibly that the Constitution 
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limits federal power.”  Ilya Shapiro, State Suits Against Health Reform Are Well 
Grounded in Law—and Pose Serious Challenges, 29 Health Affairs 1229, 1232 
(June 2010).  It would turn citizens into subjects. 
As one district court recognized, “[n]ever before has the Commerce Clause 
and the associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this far.”  Virginia 
v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612 (E.D. Va. 2010).  Only the Supreme Court is 
empowered to reconsider the outer bounds of federal power under the Commerce 
and Necessary and Proper Clauses, and the district court properly interpreted the 
existing doctrinal limits in this area.  Accordingly, amicus respectfully asks this 
court to affirm the district court. 
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